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The significant  operational implications  underlying  the Bank's estimates of per capita
GNP, represent important considerations in systematizing  our use of official (and other)
rates in determining the exchange rate  to be used in the Atlas methodology. The paper
explores the potential for a  system of time  series for various conversion factors, and a
corresponding set of time series for weights (Table 1).
The International Ecoromics Department (IEC) has expanded the availability  of the
repertoire of exchange rates; a major task in this system, however, is the redistribution of
weights among multiple rates.The starting premise is that a single official rate has a weight
of 1.0 in all years; all other rates have (implicitly) zero-weights. We can examine the issue
of how the  "composite" conversion factor would look like if such rates  have non-zero
weights. IEC's practice  is to take into account such multiple exchange rates  and to the
extent data are available, estimates an appropriate conversion factor from a multitude of
exchange rates prevailing in a country (see the examples of Egypt and Syria).
In this connection, the paper reviews the main concerns about the adequacy of the
official exchange  rate as a general conversion factor when in effect countries maintain dual
or multiple exchange  practices, or there are active foreign exchanges  in the parallel or black
markets, or that there is a high incidence of price controls and trade-related restrictions.ii
One aspect receiving  special attention is the compilation of a general purpose (composite)
conversion factor from a set of multiple exchange rates for different types of international
transactions. The paper identifies the kinds of evidence that are relevant in assessing the
impac. of these practices on exchange rates; provides illustrative examples of IEC using
the evidence to derive alternative conversion factors (Tables 4 and 5), and concludes by
identifying  countries where review, and adjustment if necessary,  of the official exchange  rate
merit serious consideration. These countries are shown in the Summary Table below. It is
of interest to note that the countries emerging from this paper as needing review of their
official exchange rates cover some 70 percent of countries listed in the  Fund's Annual
Report on Exchange  Arrangements  and E%change  Restrictions  as having "cost-related
import restrictions" and/or  maintaining - iultiple exchL Je rates for exports and imports.
It should be emphasized that adoption of approaches suggested in the paper will not
necessarily  lead to an unambiguous conclusion  regarding the "right  choice" of the conversion
factor. It must also be recognized at the outset that any adjustments to the official  exchange
rate require intimate knowledge  of the trade and exchange system  of the country concerned.
Nevertheless, these approaches improve the basis for judgments that will always  be required
in such a decision. More information from and regular discussions  with Regional economists
will, hopefully, lead to the assembly  of adequate information to enhance the robustness of
such judgments.iii
Summary Table:  Countries Recommended for Review/Adjustment of Exchange Rates
!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  --.-- __  .... .........  ....  .... ............................  .
(1) DEVIATIONS  of MULTIPLE RATES
>30%le  >20% < 30%o  >15% <20%e  >10%/c  <20%o
#  Egypt  Bahamas  #  Yemen AR





(2) DEVIATIONS  of BLACK  MARKET  RATE
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#  Bangladesh  Haiti  Korea  Yugoslavia















Trinidad & Tobago  #  Identified  in the Fund's Annual  Report  on
Tunisia  Exchange  Arrangements and Exchange  Restrictions
#  Venezuela  as maintaining  multiple exchange  rate system.
Zambia
Zimbabwe
(3) TRADE TAXES  ("Implicit  Tariff  Rates")
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(4) VOLATILITY  in EXCHANGE  RATES  and TRADE  VOLUME
Select countries on basis of Volatility  in quarterly exchange  rates (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Yugoslavia.)I. INTRODUCTION
A System  of Conversion  Factors and Weights
1.  This paper discusses issues and procedures to develop a time series of alternative
conversion factors with corresponding weights  for use in converting and presenting macro-
level country statistics in a common unit of account, e.g. the U.S. dollar.  The potentially
significant  operational implications underlying the Bank's estimates of per capita GNP for
the  Operational  Guidelines  represent  important  considerations  in  the  search  for  an
appropriate conversion factor, notably for use in the Atlas. The discussion is set within the
context of IECs  present procedures for choosing exchange rates for use in the Atlas and
the Operational Guidelines.' Departures from the use of an exchange  rate that is not closely
related to the rate at which international transactions actually t  -e place are tolerated over
a  wide range.  However, when the  deviation between the  official rate  and  the  rates
effectively  applied to foreign transactions are egregiously  large, any conversion of principal
imacroeconomic  indicators based on the official exchange rate are rendered meaningless.
2.  The Bank's practice in choosing conversion  factors involves  IEC staff systematically
reviewing  and occasionally  estimating  alternative conversion  factors,  often involving  dialogue
with country operational  staff. When "conditions are  egregiously different from those
'  A review  of the methodological  issues,  including  choosing  appropriate conversion  factors, relevant to the
calculation of per  capita GNP  for  operational purposes is found in  "Per Capita Income - Estimating
Internationally  Comparable Numbers,"  (International Economics  Department, World Bank, January 13, 1989).
See, in particular,  Annex 4 which  discusses  the search for better conversion  factors.2
prevailing under free trade, alternative conversioi. factors are estimated that are deemed
to reflect the actual rate at which foreign transactions take place. Such estimates seek to
take into account the nature and restrictiveness  of trading regime, information on relative
prices, and the evolution of reai exchange rates."  2  Estimating alternative conversion  factors
is a difficult process and, in part judgmental.In those highly egregious cases, the Bank
attempts to estimate alternative conversion  factors that permit meaningful calculations for
intercountry comparisons.
3.  The repertoire of exchange rates available has expanded. In addition to the official
exchange rate3 shown in the Fund's International  Financial Statistics (IFS), secondary and
tertiary rates are also available in the IFS. In addition, IEC has created an internal file on
parallel  or  black exchange rates  from various sources. These  are  weekly or  monthly
quotations covering the  period  1960-89 from Pick's Currency  Yearbook, International
Report: Statistical Market Letter, and Africa Analysis. Other rates (e.g.,  purchasing-power-
parities, rates accounting for trade taxes and subsidies) can also be estimated, as explained
later in the paper. With the increasing  availability  of country-specific  multiple exchange rate
data, the paper suggests that these alternate conversion factors be included in a system so
that time series of alternate conversion  factors can be made by choosing  a preference order
among different sets of conversion possibilities.  Obviously the choice 'f  preference order
varies from country to country and also from year to year within each country.
2  Ibid;  pp. 2-3.
3  In general, the official  exchange  rate is that reported as line rf in IMF,lnternational  Financial  Statistics
(IFS) (Washington  D.C.; International Monetary  Fund).3
4.  A major task of this system is the assembly of appropriate weights. The starting
premise in the envisaged system  of alternative conversion  factors and corresponding  weights
is that the official exchange rate has a weight of 1.0 and all other rates implicitly  assigned
zero-weights.  It  is expected that further review and analysis of the trade  and exchange
system by IEC staff, and more information from and regular discussions with Regional
economists on various exchange rates will, hopefully lead to the assembly of information
on some  distributional weights  to be attachea to the various rates. Table 1 below illustrates
the range of conversion factors and weights underlying this objective.  It is expected that
users and analysts can individually  devise a set of simple rules to derive what may be called
"the preferred" conversion factor.
Table  1:  EGYPT  - System of Alternative  Conversion  Factors  and Weights
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
lternative  Conversion  Factors
Principal  (official) rate  (IFS  RF)  0.7000  0.7000  0.7000  0.7000  0.7000  0.7000  0.7000  0.7000  0.7000  0.8516
Secondary rate  NA  0.7390  0.8317  0.8317  0.8317  1.3010  1.3503  1.5015  2.2128  2.5712
3.  Tertiary rate  NA  1.0100  1.1300  1.1453  1.2543  1.5488  1.8838  2.1459  2.5082  2.6452
4.  Parallel/black  market  rate  0.7609  0.8772  1.0236  1.1039  1.2184  1.4588  1.8975  2.1894  2.5082  2.6452
5.  Purchasing Power Parity Rate  (1970) /1  0.5917  0.5503  0.5893  0.6133  0.6553  0.6914  0.7849  0.9079  1 1850  -
6.  Purchasing Power Parity Rate  (1980) /1  0.7000  (Q.6510  0.6971  0.7255  0.7752  0.8179  0.9285  1.0740  1.4018  -
7.  Purchasing Power Parity Rate  (1987) /1  0.4562  0.4243  0.4544  0.4729  0.5052  0.5331  0.6052  0.7000  0.9137  -
8.  Merchandise  weighted  conversion factor
Wei2hts
1.  Principal (official) rate  (IFS  RF)  0.4350  0.4350  0.43450  0.4350  0.4350  0.4350  0.4150  0.3690  0.3200  -
Secondary rate  0.3150  0.3150  03150  03150  0.1400  0.1400  0.1830  0.2370  0.2880
Tertiarv rate  0.2500  0.2500  0.2500  0.2500  0.4250  0.4250  0.4020  0.3940  0.3920
Parallel/black  market rate
Purchasing Power Parity Rate  (1970)
Purchasing Power Parity Rate  (1980)
Purchasing Power Parity Rate  (1988)
Merchandise  weighted conversion factor
Memo Items
Nominal exchange rate  index (1980  =100)  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  82.2
Real  exchange rate  index (1980= 100) /2  100.0  93.1  98.6  102.1  109.4  115.2  129.7  148.3  193.0
"Weighted Avg. Conversion  Factor"  0.7152  0.7898  0.8490  0.8528  0.9540  1.1449  1.2949  1.4596  1.8445
/1  The purchasing power parity relationship  is computed  as R.  *  (Pd,/Ptd),  where R.  is the exchange rate  in the base year "O". Pd,  and
P,t are the domestic price index and US (or any other foreign country) price index, respectively, in time period "t" (see Chapter  V below).
/2  Nominal exchange rate  index divided by relative domestic absorption deflator  index; this shows the real exchange movement.4
5.  Such a matrix of conversion factors and corresponding weights could provide the
mechanism for the following:  (a) a systematic  approach to the weighting  of alternative rates;
(b) estimating the effects of alternative weighting  schemes, (c) determine what would be the
effects of incorporating parallel or black market exchange rates;  (d) provide the basis for
less erratic and unpredictable fluctuations in the data shown in the Atlas, Worid Tables
etc. and (e) improved and more transparent documentation of methods and "special  cases."
Scope of Paper
6.  The focus is on  conversion factors that  are  as  representative as  practicable  of
transaction or "effective"  conversion  factors. The choice of an appropriate conversion factor
is  based  on  the  clear  principle that  the  rate  chosen  must be  that  at  which foreign
transactions are effected. The Bank, like the Fund or any other international institution,
would prefer to  comnert  national currency data into a common numeraire at prevailing
market exchange rate. 4 Determining the prevailing market rate, however, is a matter of
judgment, even for international transactions and in the absence of exchange and trade
restrictions. It must be stressed at the outset that much is beyond the scope of this paper.In
particular,  the  search here  is not  for an "equilibrium" exchange rate  or  that  which is
sustainable and  compatible with reasonable economic growth and  a  viable balance  of
payments situation in the medium term. Suffice  to ¢-v, countries are seldom in equilibrium
and the labelling of an exchange rate as "being in equilibrium" is usually associated,
4  The technical  issues of using  the period average of the official  exchange  rate as a convenient  and readily
available  conversion  factor, and the primary  requirements for moving  from shorter period to longer period rates
are discussed  in Section  VIII.5~~~~~ explicitly  or implicitly,  with a complex  policy  network and policy changes that bring the rate
to the "eqtuilibrium"  level. 5
7.  The paper emphasizes the implications for Bank estimates of per capita, the kinds
of evidence relevant in assessing  the underlying conversion factors, and identifies countries
where review, and  adjustment if deemed necessary, of the official exchange rate  merits
serious consideration. The paper provides illustrative examples in using the  evidence to
derive alternative conversion factors.
8.  This paper takes the view that the exchange rate (,onversion factor' is a price used
in international transactions. Restrictions introduced into the price system in international
transactions impact on  the domestic relative price level. The reliance, in general, on the
offic 14d exchange rate sometimes produces substantial discrepancies in the data. The paper
reviews  the main concerns about the adequacy of the official  exchange rate as a conversion
factor when in effect countries maintain dual or multiple exchange practices, or there are
parallel or black market foreign exchange activities, or there is a high incidence of price
controis and  trade-related  restrictions.  One  aspect  receiving special  attention  is the
compilation of a general purpose conversion factor from a set of multiple exchange rates
for different types of international transactions.
5  A useful survey of this topic is given in G.G. Johnson, 'Formulation of Exchange Rate Policies in
Adjustment Programs,"  IMF Occasional  l.  jer, No. 36 (Washington,D.C.:  International Monetary  Fund, August
1985).6
9.  The  existence of  a  parallel  or  secondary market,  where  a  portion  of  current
transactions takes place at  floating exchange rates that are more depreciated than the rate
in  the  official market,  is prima  facie  evidence that  the  official exchange rate  may be
inappropriate and therefore, requires further review.  Also, a priori, it is reasonable to expect
that  countries  with  price  controis  and  trade-related  restrictions  wou!d exhibit  large
deviations between the transaction and official rates.
Magnitudes  of Deviations  as Signals
10.  Any large deviations  of the respective  conversion  factors from the official  rate should
be taken as signals that further review of the adequacy of the official exchange rate as an
appropriate conversion factor is warranted. When the official exchange rate is judged to
diverge by an exceptionally large margin from the rate effectively  applied to international
transactions, that  serves as  to  signal that  an  alternate  conversion factor needs  to  be
estimated  if conversions are  to  be meaningful. Any decision on  the  preference  order
between  alternative  conversion  factors  would  have  to  take  into  account  relevant
country-specific  knowledge, not just the magnitudes of the deviations  between the two rates.
For example, where we know national compilers used the official exchange rate to assign
a  national  currency value to  international  transactions, that  rate  must be used  as the
conversion factor, regardless of whether it was the rate actually applied to international
transactions. Assume in this instance that the two rates (the official rate used by national
compilers and the transaction rate) are significantly  different. If a decision is made to use
the known transaction rate as a conversion factor, say for GNP per capita computations, it
is necessary that all the expenditure and value-added components of the national accounts7
in local currency be "modified".  This should be avoided. Notwithstanding  that the official
rate may be egregiously  different from the transaction rate, the conversion factor to be used
in the above instance should be the official  exchange rate as used by the national compilers.8
II. CONVERSION FACTORS and
RELATIVE  PRICE MOVEMENTS
Conversion Factor as a Price
11.  This paper focuses on the search for conversion  factors that reflect market valuations
(prices). The market-valuation principle serves to measure the economic value of resource
transferred between two economies.  External transactions should be viewed as the exchange
of goods for money. In this connection, the role of the conversion factor is to define the
price of money in  terms of goods. Whenever governments impose price and  non-price
measures in international  trade, valuation or price  (i.e. conversion factor) adjustments
should be made that will serve to bring the valuation closer in concept to market value. The
problkm, therefore, is to determine how far the price deviates from or approximates the
market valuation.
12.  The exchange rate is the relative price of two national monies and must bear a close
relationship to price  level developments in the  two countries. Thus the  exchange rate
determines the relative prices of traded goods and, therefore, international competitiveness.
Thus the conversion factor should be considered as a "price"  and, like any other price, it can
influence the environment in which domestic and international transactions are conducted.
As a price, the conversion factor appears as exogenous to any individual transaction in the
market but endogenous to the aggregated system of market demands and supplies because9
the conversion  factor is determined by interacting supply  and demand for foreign exchange.
It is shifts in these supply and demand schedules that give rise to price (i.e., exchange rate)
changes. Thus it should be recognized that the exchange rate is a price that balances the
desire to exchange one currency for another in order to effect trade in goods and services.
The introduction of restrictions into the price system prevents the price from fulfilling a
stabilizing function of equalizing supply and demand, thus affecting relative prices, the
profitability of individual activities,  and thus resulting in distortions in resource allocations.
Conversion  Factor and Price Levels of Traded/NonTraded  Goods
13.  The imposition of price measures (tariffs, specific taxes, import surcharges, advance
deposits on imports, export taxes and subsidies,  and multiple exchange rates) and non-price
measures (quotas, licencing  ) alter relative price levels between sectors, e.g., traded goods
and nontraded goods. Here we are confronted with the issue of the distinction between
"traded goods (sector)" and "nontraded goods (sector)" as well as between "tradables" and
"nontiadables." In very general terms, traded goods can be regarded as those that can be
imported (and exported), while nontraded goods are those without close, foreign-produced
substitutes and must therefore be supplied by domestic producers. More specifically,  traded
goods can be regarded as "goods that are sufficiently substitutable with goods produced
abroad that there exists an international market; nontraded goods are those that are not
highly substitutable with foreign-produced goods so that international trade in these goods
does not exist". 6 A very narrow dichotomy is that given in the foreign trade statistics in the
6  George A.  MacKenzie and Susan M. Schadler, "Exchange Rate Policies and Diversification  in Oil
Exporting Countries," (Unpublished;  International Monetary  Fund, May 9, 1980)  pg.3.10
GDP accounts where GDP is divided into goods and services actually traded (exports and
imports, i.e., "traded goods") and goods and services absorbed in the domestic economy
("nontraded goods").
14.  Provided a market exists  through which trade could potentially be conducted, a good
need not actually be traded to be termed a "traded" good- it becomes a "tradable good." If
one classifies  as tradable any good that either is internationally traded or could be traded
at some plausible range of variation in relative prices, then the tradable category becomes
very broad indeed.
15.  However, given the close integration of the traded and nontraded sectors in most
economies, in practice the distinction between industries producing traded (tradable) goods
and those producing nontraded (nontradable) goods is rather tenuous. Rather, a country's
output can be thought of as lying  along a spectrum of greater or lesser exposure to foreign
competition. Goldstein  and  Officer 7 suggest the  use of  both  trade  flows and  market
behavior, particularly the degree of independence between domestic and foreign prices, in
identifying tradable  and  nontradable  commodities or  industries. They  suggest three
complementary criteria to distinguish  between tradables and nontradables: (a) the degree
of foreign trade participation should be substantially  higher for tradables than nontradables;
(b) cross-country  correlations of price changes should be much higher for tradables than
7  Morris Goldstein and Lawrence H. Officer,  "The Measures of Prices and Productivity  for Tradable and
Nontradable Goods",  Review  of Income  and  Wealth,  Vol. 4, December 1979,  pp. 413-425.11
nontradables; and (c) tradables should be closer substitutes for traded goods from other
countries than are nontradables.
16.  Policies adopted to protect the domestic traded goods sector, such as import tariffs,
export subsidies, quotas, licensing, have the immediate effect of increasing the  domestic
price of the commodities in question. Consider the following  simple examples:
-- an importer pays the c.i.f.  import price of $1.00  for a unit of product X. Converted
at the official exchange rate of LC200.00 = $1, the price (i.e., the exchange rate) paid by
the importer is LC200.00. A 10 percent tariff (or specific taxes, import surcharges) on X
means that  the  importer  effectively pays LC220.00 in  the  transaction. The price  (i.e.,
conversion factor) increases from LC200.00  = $1 to LC220.00 = $1. A world market price
of $1.00 now corresponds to a domestic price of LC220.00;
--  in the  meat export industry, meat is sold at world market prices. The  meat
exporter receives the  world market  price  of  $1.00 per  unit. Converted at  the  official
exchange rate of LC200.00  to the dollar, the exporter receives a price of LC200.00. An
export subsidy of 25 percent on that unit of export means that the  exporter effectively
receives LC250.00  in the transaction.
17.  Specifically,  for a country facing a given world price of traded goods, the domestic
price  of traded  goods is simply the  world price  adjusted for changes in  the  domestic
currency value of foreign exchange, so that price measures introduced into the trade system12
have the immediate effect of raising the relative price of traded goods to nontraded goods.
The new, higher relative prices of traded goods in terms of nontraded goods are likely to
induce consumers to  substitute nontraded  for traded goods. The increase demand for
nor.4aded goods puts pressure on the p.  z-e  of nontraded goods. The increase in the traded
goods price raises the general price level. Higher wage demands aimed at restoring real
wages drive up the cost of producing traded and nontraded goods. The pervasive effect on
the real cost of domestic factors of production will impact on the  competitiveness of the
country's traded goods sector.13
III. CONVERSION  FACTORS  and MULTIPLE
EXCHANGE  RATE  PRACTICES
18.  Multiple exchange rates arise directly when separate groups of foreign exchange
transactions are conducted at different exchange rates;  they also arise indirectly when a
variety of taxes, subsidies, surcharges,  or equivalent devices are applied to foreign exchange
transactions.  Multiple exchange rates are usually adopted to address external payments
difficulties by attempting to  relieve the  pressure on  different elements of the  external
account. The most common features of multiple currency regimes are the maintenance of
a  preferential  rate  for essential imports, often  combined with  debt  service payments;
separate  rates based  on a  distinction between capital and current  transactions; 9 and  a
separate rate for some important current invisible payments.
Effects of Multiple Currency  Practices  on Conversion  Factors
19.  The operation of a system of multiple exchange rates leads to effects very similar to
the intended results of a system of tariffs and subsidies.  The percentage difference between
8  For a broad historical review of country experiences  with multiple exchange  systems, the reasons for
resorting to such system, their outcome, and the significance  for the Fund in terms of its jurisdiction and
maintenance over  the  international exchange system, see  the  following unpublished documents of  the
International Monetary Fund: "Rev.ew  of Experience with Multiple Exchange Rate Regimes", (SM/84/64),
March 19,  1984; "Review  of Multiple  Exchange  Rate Regimes  - Background  Information",  (SM/84/65), March
20, 1984;  and "Multiple  Currency  Practices  Applicable  Solely  to Capital Transactions",  (SM/85/19), January 19,
1985.
9  For a discussion  of issues arising  from dual exchange  rate markets for capital and current transactions,  see
Anthony  Lanyi,  "Separate  Exchange  Markets for Capital and Current Transactions," IMF  Staff  Papers,  Vol. 22
(Washington  D.C.: International Monetary  Fund, November 1975)  pp. 714-49.14
the exchange rate applicable in a particular transaction and the basic (official) rate can be
regarded as a tariff on imports, or a subsidy on exports. The impact of these rates is on
goods where relevant consumption and production decisions are sensitive to relative price
changes brought about  by the  application of differentiated  rates  for traded  goods. In
principle, a set of differentially appreciated and depreciated rates should provide similar
economic incentives  and distortions to those resulting  from a system of subsidies and tariffs.
In terms of its effect on price and resource allocations,  the application of a depreciated rate
to "non-essential"  imports to foster import substitution by domestic producers is similar to
the imposition of a tariff on imports that compete with domestic production;' 0 essentially,
the importer and the domestic consumer pay a domestic price that is higher than the world
market price (i.e.; more local currency per unit foreign currency).
20.  The choice between multiple currency  practices and a system of taxes and subsidies
may be based on administrative feasibility.'"  On the other hand, multiple rates may be
considered less expensive to administer than a system of taxes and subsidies that require
complicated administrative machinery.
10  The very similar effects on prices and resource allocations  of multiple  exchange  rates and a system of
tariffs/taxes and subsidies  are discussed  in details in, John F. Laker, "Fiscal  Proxies  for Devaluation:  A General
Review,"  (Unpublished;  International  Monetary  Fund, October 21, 1980);  and George A. Mackenzie  and Susan
M.  Schadler, 'Exchange  Rate  Policies and  Diversification in  Oil  Exporting Countries," (Unpublished;
international Monetary Fund, May 9, 1980).
"  The basic problems  in the use of fiscal  proxies  for exchange  rate changes are discussed  in John F. Laker,
"Fiscal  Proxies to Devaluation,"  (Unpublished;  International Monetary  Fund, October 21, 1980).15
Incidence  of Multiple Currency  Practices
21.  The incidence of multiple exchange rates among Fund members is shown in Table
2. The Fund's Annual Report on Exchange  Arrangements  and Exchange  Restrictions  has
reported  that developing countries have, in general, moved towards reduced reliance on
multiple  currency practices, or  made  progress in  either  simplfying multiple currency
practices, or in reducing the distortions associated with them.  A look at Table 2 reveals
that  virtually all  countries wAvith  multiple currency practices employ different rates  for
different types of imports (e.g.; essential imports against payments on invisibles) as well as
for exports. Multiple exchange rates for about 20 member countries are shown in the IFS.
Deviations  of Multiple Rates
22.  The existence of a multiple exchange system provides indications that the use of the
official rate  as a  conversion factor is inappropriate.  The  larger the  deviations in  the
multiple rates  relative to  the  :icial  rate,  the  stronger the  reasons for a  careful and
systematic review of the various rates.  The focus on multiple rates should be determined
on the basis of the magnitude of the premium as well as the size of the market, i.e., how
much economic activity is performed through this channel.
12 For a detailed  discussion  of developments  in multiple  currency  practices,  see International  Monetary  Fund,
Annual Report  on  Exchange Arrangements and  Exchange Restrictions, (Washington,D.C.;  International
Monetary Fund, 1986);  pp. 18-20.16




Country  for  Exports  Imports
Exports  and Imports  More Than  1 Rate  More Than  1 Rate
Afghanistan  x  x  x
* Argentina  x  x
* Bangladesh  x  x  x
Bolivia  x  x
Brazil  x  x  x
Colombia  x  x  x
Dominica  x  x  x
* Dominican  Rep  x  x  x
Ecuador  x  x  x
* Egypt  x  x  x
*  El Salvador  x  x  x
Gambia  x  x  x
Ghana  x  x  x
Grenada  x
* Guatemala  x  x  x
GuyanA  x  x
Honduras  x  x  x
*  Hungary  x  x  x
*  Jamaica  x  x
Kenya  x  x
* Lao  x  x
*  Mexico  x  x
Nicaragua  x  x  x
Nigeria  x  x  x
*  Paraguay  x  x  x
*  Peru  x  x  x
* Poland  x  x  x
* Romania  x  x  x
*  Somalia  x  x  x
* Sudan  x  x  x
Syria  x  x  x
Uruguay  x  x
*  Venezuela  x  x  x
Vietnam  x  x  x
W.Samoa  x  x
e  Yemen AR  x  x
Zambia  x  x
Total  34  31  32
Source: Extracted  from  IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(Washington  DC:1989)
*  Principal  secondary,  tertiary rates,  and their  applicability to types of transactions  are found in IFS.17
23.  Table 3 shows the distribution of deviations of multiple rates from the official rate
of those countries for which multiple rates are available in the IFS."
Table 3:  Distribution of Deviations  of Multiple  Rates from IFS_RF
Range (%)  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
0.0-5.0  2  1  2  2  4  2  4  3  5  3
5.1-10.0  1  3  1  1  0  1  1  3  1  0
10.1-15.0  0  2  2  1  4  1  0  1  0  0
15.1-20.0  2  1  1  1  2  2  1  1  0  0
20.1-25.0  1  1  1  2  0  1  1  0  1  1
25.1-30.0  1  2  2  2  0  2  3  1  1  0
30.1-40.0  2  1  1  1  1  0  0  1  2  1
40.1-50.0  1  2  3  1  0  0  0  1  0  0
50.1-60.0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  0
60.1-70.0  2  1  0  1  2  0  1  0  1  1
70.1-80.0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0
80.1-90.0  0  1  0  0  1  2  0  1  0  0
90.1-100.0  0  1  0  0  0  2  1  0  0  0
>100  0  0  1  3  3  3  4  2  3  1
TOTAL  13  16  14  17  19  16  17  15  14  7
Source: Multiple rates are from IFS.
24.  Almost half of them maintain multiple rates with the premium exceeding  30 percent.
In  recent  years, the  spread  between multiple rates  has narrowed  for most countries.
However, the  spread has remained consistently high in Egypt (exceeding 100 percent),
Paraguay and  Venezuela  (about 90  percent),  Guatemala  (averaging 60 percent),  and
Romania (about 40 percent).
`u  As trade and exchange  systems  have been liberalized,  and multiple exchange  systems  have  been unified,
the number of countries with multiple rates shown  in the IFS has decreased.18
"Composite"  Conversion  Factor
25.  The proper use of multiple rates demands a "matrix"  weighting approach, that is, a
distribution of weights among the multiple exchange rates. What is envisaged here is a
system with time series for multiple rates and a corresponding  set of time series for weights.
Obviously,  adjustments to the official  and multiple rates require intimate knowledge of the
applications of respective rates to specific transactions.  Two illustrative examples of IEC's
attempt  to develop the envisaged system for composite conversion factors are shown in
Table 4 for Egypt, and Table 5 for Syria.
26.  Table 4 below illustrates the Egypt situation where the multiple rates are from the
IFS but the weights are from the Fund and Regional staff.  Notice that the premium enjoyed
by each of the rates in the secondary and tertiary markets is very significant.
Table 4:  EGYPT  -- Rates  and Weights for Computinig
Average Exchange Rates  from Multiple  Rates
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Alternative  Conversion  Factors
1.  Principal (Central Bank) Rate  0.7000  0.7000  0.7000  0.7000  0.7000  0.7000  0.7000  0.7000  0.7000  0.8516
2.  Secondaly  (Comrnercial  Bank) Rate  NA  0.7390  0.8317  0.8317  0.8317  13010  1.3503  1.5015  2.2128  2.5172
3.  Tertiary (Parallel) Rate  NA  1.0100  1.1300  1.1453  1.2543  1.5488  1.8838  2.1459  2.5082  2.6452
Weiehts
1.1  Principal  (Central Bank) Rate  0.4350  0.4350  0.4350  0.4350  0.4350  0.4350  0.4150  03690  0.3200  NA
1.2 Secondary  (Commercial  Bank) Rate  0.3150  03150  03150  03150  0.1400  0.1400  0.1830  0.2370  0.2880  NA
13  Tertiary (Parallel) Rate  0.2500  0.250o  0.2500  0.2500  0.4250  0.4250  0.4020  0.3940  0.3920  NA
"COMPOSITE"  Rate  NA  0.7898  0.8490  0.8528  0.9540  1.1449  1.2949  1.4596  1.8445  NA
[(1*1.1) + (2*1.2) + (3-13)]
Memo Items
GNP per capita (using Principal  Rate)  573  553  637  690  771  847  925  1034  1274  NA
GNP per capita (using "Composite"  Rate)  NA  1432  798  582  611  606  576  561  592  NA
Ratio: "Composite"  Rate/Principal Rate  NA  1.13  1.21  1.22  1.36  1.64  1.85  2.09  2.64  NA
'Composite"  per cap/"IFS RF"'  per capNA  2.59  1.25  0.84  0.79  0.72  0.62  0.54  0.46  NA
Source: Multiple rates are from IFS
Weights:  1980-85:  Unpublished data from the Fund's Information  Notice System;
1986-88:  Regional Staff.19
27.  The  respective premiums for the  commercial (secondary) rate  and the  parallel
(tertiary) rate  are  extremely high. Given such a  high degree  of deviation among the
different rates, it is to be expected that the average of the multiple rates is significantly
different from the official (Central Bank) rate. Perhaps what is more significant from the
Bank's operational point of view is that with the shift (and therefore weights) away from
the official (Central Bank) rate in recent years, its is likely  that Egypt's per capita GNP will
remain within the threshold for Bank's IDA eligibility." 4
28.  The Syria example (Table 5 below) is intended to  illustrat.o  the types of relevant
information IEC staff can be expected to extract from various Bank and Fund documents
to estimate a trade-weighted average of officially  recognized exchange rates.  The Fund's
Annual Report on  Exchange Arrangements  and Exchange Restrictions lists  Syria as
maintaining multiple rates, but these rates are not available in the IFS. On the basis of
information in  the  Fund's  Annual Report on  Exchange Arrangements  and  Exchange
Restrictions,  and unpublished Recent  Economic  Development  on member countries, Table
5 below illustrates the procedures by which IEC staff, in consultation with Regional staff,
derives a time series of multiple rates and a corresponding time series of weights.
29.  As can be seen in Table 5, the impact of the 30 percent premium in the secondary
market is dampened by the fact that transactions in this market is only about one-third of
total transactions. Thus, the "composite"  rate does not exhibit the wide margin of deviation
'4  The Bank uses the weighted ("composite")  exchange  rate in the computation  of Egypt's  GNP per capita
for the Atlas and the Operational Guidelines.20
seen in the example on Egypt. This does not detract from the fact that there is a substantial
differential in the GNP per capita estimate for the Bank's Operational Guidelines.
Table  5:  SYRIA - Derivation  of Composite  Exchange Rate
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
Multlile  Rates
1.  Principal Rate  /1  3.95  3.95  3.95  3.95  3.95  11.225
2.  Secondary Rate: /1  5.45  5.45  5.45  5.45  5.45
3.  Tertiary Rate  5.70  7.06  8.80  9.81  10.00
Derivation  of Welghts  1. Principal  (OMcial)  Rate  for Public Sector
Merchandise  Trade
Exports  % Total GNFS  20.9  21.8  20.4  16.6  19.3
Imports  % Total  GNFS  48.9  493  44.9  36.7  33.0
% Share  in Total  GNFS  69.8  71.1  65.3  53.3  52.3
2. Secondary (Parallel)  Rate  for Private  Sector
Trade  in Goods and NFS
Exports GNFS  % Total  GNFS  7.4  6.4  6.8  13.1  14.2
Imports  GNFS % Total GNFS  14.9  13.7  18.6  23.9  24.8
%  Share in Total GNFS  22.3  20.1  25.3  37.0  38.9
3. Tertiary  Rate for Tourism
%  Share in Total GNFS  7.90  8.88  9.37  9.64  8.82
Summary  Weights
1.1  Principal  0.70  0.71  0.65  0.53  0.52  1.00
2.1  Secondary  0.22  0.20  0.25  0.37  0.39
3.1  Tertiary  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.09
0*00 nCOMPOSITE" Rate  0*00  4.4225  4.5269  4.7844  5.0701  5.0676  11.225
Computed  as: [(1*1.1) + (2*2.1) + (3*3.1)1
Memo Items
GNP per capita  (Atlas..principal  rate)  1919  1849  1946  2053  2155  1954
GNP per  capita  (Atlas..composite  rate)  1703  1629  1670  1688  1701  1711
Ratio:  Composite rate  to Official rate  1.13  1.15  1.22  1.29  1.29  1.00
"Composite'  per  cap/"Atlas'  per  0.89  0.88  0.86  0.82  0.79  0.88
Source: IMF,  'Recent  Economic Development"  (Unpublished);  March  6, 1987; and March 9,1988.21
Countries  for Review  and Adjustment  for Multiple  Rates
30.  The time series multiple rates and corresponding time series weights derived in
Tables 4 and 5 form the crux of the envisaged matrix of conversion factors and weights.
31.  The examples of Egypt and Syria illustrate the operational significance of the need
for careful review of the presence of multiple conversion factors. Table 2 lists  countries
that should come under the type of review  shown for Egypt and Syria.  Given the continued
high  spread  between  these  rates  from the  official rate  and,  therefore,  the  potential
operational impact of per capita GNP estimates, particular attention should be directed
at Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Romania, and Venezuela.
32.  It should be emphasized that a definitive  assessment  would require more information
from and continued dialogue with Regional staff. Emphasis is placed, wherever data are
available, on the applicability of the respective rates on the types of transactions.22
IV. BIACK or PARALLEL  MARKET EXCHANGE RATES
Formal and Informal Parallel Exchange Markets
33.  Lindauer suggests that "a parallel market is a structure generated  in response to
government  interventions which create  a  situation  of  excess demand  or  supply in  a
particular product or factor market which is both dependent upon conditions in the official
market and responsive to market forces."' 5 For example, the excess demand for foreign
exchange in the official market, resulting from exchange controls, is satisfied at a premium
price in a secondary, or parallel market. The official,  and overvalued, exchange rate creates
a parallel, usually called "black,"  market for foreign currency. A parallel exchange market
is one of the by-products of restrictionist trade and exchange policies. Import and export
duties,  and  import  quotas  generate  parallel  markets by  creating  excess demand  for
commodities at illegal, pre-tax prices. The removal of government interventions can unify
an otherwise parallel market.
34.  Are parallel markets always  illegal? A formal para:lel market typically  is introduced
when a government resorts to a secondary exchange system as a transitional measure to
correct for external imbalance and, therefore, avoid a formal depreciation. Usually  essential
'  David  L.  Lindauer,  "Parallel,  Fragmented,  or Black?  Defining  Market  Structure  in Developing  Economies,"
World Development,  Vol. 17, No. 12 (Cambridge,  MA: Harvard  Institute  for International  Development,
December  1989);  pp. 1871-1880.23
imports and exports are conducted at the (relatively overvalued) official rate, while other
transactions, including capital flows, are assigned to the  secondary exchange market. On
the other hand, the tightness and effectiveness of exchange controls result in transactions
that operate outside the normal and regulated channels, that is, in an informal secondary
exchange market which is characterized by risks and penalty structure.
35.  In  this  paper,  the  terms  "black  market"  and  "parallel  market"  are  used
interchangeably, as well as "illegal"  and "unofficial"  to  refer to "market structures which
result  from  suboptimal  government  interventions which create  a  situation  of  excess
demand." 16
Purchasing  Power  Parity and Factors  Affecting  Parallel Market Rates
36.  In his empirical paper on black markets for currency, Culbertson'  postulates that
given the official exchange rate, changes in the parallel market rate will occur due to shifts
in  either the  supply or  demand schedule for foreign exchange. One  of the  most likely
sources of change stems from variations in the equilibrium rate. Since the equilibrium or
market-clearing rate is unobservable,  it is proxied through the ratio of domestic-to-foreign
price level -- i.e., the purchasing power parity relationship is instrumentai in determining
the (unobservable) equilibrium rate. A secondary consideration concerns the role of the
government's holdings of  international  reserves, especially foreign exchange holdings.
16  Lindauer,  Op.ciL, pp.  1878.
17  W. Patton Culbertson,  "Empirical Regularities  in black Markets for Currency," World Development, Vol.
17, No. 12 (Cambridgc,  MA: Harvard Institute for International  Development,  December  1989); pp. 1907-1919.24
Consider the  following exchange-control scenario in  Culbertson's study: an overvalued
currency produces a supply of foreign exchange; a black market price of foreign exchange
emerges  as  the  government  allocates this  quantity to  the  market  (e.g.  to  importers,
investors, travel abroad, etc.); consider further that the government may choose to add to
its reserve holdings, in which case the  supply of foreign exchange is  reduced; or  the
government may choose to draw down its reserves, thus increasing the supply of foreign
exchange. Consequently, changes in  the level of foreign exchange holdings represent  a
potential influence on the parallel market rate.
37.  Culbertson's study for 10 countries with long-existing  exchange controls and black
market activity lends support for the hypothesis that the black market rate depends on the
level of the official  rate, the foreign-to-domestic  price level (which  proxies the unobservable
equilibrium rate), and government reserve-level  policy.  The strongest coefficients  are those
relating the black market rate to changes in the foreign-to-domestic  price level. While the
R' are relatively robust for most of the countries (see the following  chapter for a discussion
of purchasing power parities as conversion factors), the large degree of serial correlation
is disturbing. This indicates the danger of inferring that only those variables with significant
coefficients are important.
38.  The supply  of foreign exchange  in this market may come from various sources. Over-
and underinvoicing of exports and imports could potentially attract significant amounts of
foreign exchange to the black markets over time. Also, if the premium on foreign currency
is significantly  higher than the official rate, a significant proportion of remittances would25
eventually pass through the illegal market. Another potential source of generating a higher
volume of foreign exchange in this market is smuggled exports, though conclusions on the
level of smuggling  is largely impressionistic. An important factor determining the level of
the black market rate is the nature and extent of the risk and penalty structure faced by
sellers who circumvent  foreign exchange  controls. Suppliers  of foreign exchange in the black
market. In general, the black market rate is likely to be more depreciated than the official
(and restriction-free) rate.  This is more so in a situation where there is strict imposition
of foreign exchange controls and the emergence of expectations of depreciation. Proper
caution should be exercised, however, in using the black market rate as an indication of the
appropriate exchange rate.
39.  While the estimated coefficients  in Culbertson's study  should be treated with caution,
the empirical results suggest that:
'black market exchange  rates are largely  determined by and reflect fundamental
economic  developments  ....  ......  the exchange  rate is the relative price of two
national monies and, while influenced  by myriad factors,  must bear a close
relationship to price level developments,  and hence monetary conditions  in the
two countries.
Parallel Market  Rates and Market Information
40.  If the exchange rate is itself a price upon which economic agents must rely in making
decisions about resource allocation, then a question in an exchange-control  economy posed
by Culbertson  is whether the parallel market rate better reflects available information on
price developments, including current expectations about the future price level, than the
18  Culbertson,  Op.cit.,  p. 191726
official rate. Indeed, the very fact that a parallel or secondary market, where a portion of
current transactions takes place at floating  exchange rates that are usually  more depreciated
than the  rate in the  official market, exists is evidence of the  inappropriate level of the
official rate." 9 Without the black market, there v. uld be little if any guide to indicate just
how overvalued the official rate had become.  The official exchange rate changes only at
intervals and  can  hardly react  to  or  reflect constantly changing economic conditions.
Consequently, Culbertson's empirical study hypothesizes that it would seem that a prima
facie  case can be made that the black market rate is likely to be a better guide to efficient
resource allocation than the official rate.
41.  If black market rates fully reflect all historical price information, including current
expectations about the future rate, then the current price will provide good prediction of
next period's price. To assess how well black market rates seem to meet this criterion of
"market efficiency",  Culbertson regresses current period black market rates on  previous
period rates. The principal conclusion from the  regression suggests that the behavior of
black  market  rates  is  consistent with  the  broad  principles of  the  efficient markets
hypothesis.
42.  The focus on the parallel exchange market should be determined on the basis of its
size, that is, how much economic activity  is performed through this channel. In addition, the
19  Culbertson,  op.cit., pp. 1915-1916; see also  Ahsan H. Mansur,  "Determining the Appropriate  Levels of
Exchange Rates for Developing Economies,"  IMF Staff Papers, Vol.  (December  1983), pp. 784-818; and G.G.
Johnson, 'Formulation  of Exchange Rate  Policies in Adjustment Programs," International  Monetary Fund, IMF
Occasional Paper, No. 36 (Washington, D.C.:International  Monetary  Fund, August 1985).27
extent to which the legal parallel market rate is allowed to float and react to market forces,
and the demand and supply elasticities of foreign exchange in the official market relative
to the secondary market will help draw some tentative inferences about the appropriateness
of the official rate as a conversion factor.
43.  Although for many developing countries the  illegal or black market can be quite
sizeable and potentially influential in the trade and exchange system, it is rarely possible
to assign (or agree on) a weight to the parallel market. The very nature of parallel markets
makes it difficult to assess total quantities marketed, since many small traders are likely to
be involved. Black or parallel market rates are seldom documented. Therefore, it is too
large  a  leap to  reach  the  conclusion that the  exchange rate  prevailing in the  parallel
(especially that  in  the illegal parallel) market  is necessarily a  reliable indicator of the
(unobserved) equilibrium rate.
Deviations  of Black Market  Rates
44.  Table 6 shows deviations of the black or parallel rates from official rates.  Again,
caution must be exercised in reading the significance  of the deviations from official rates.
These do not necessarily provide a direct indication of the appropriate exchange rate. The
divergence between the official and black market rates also depends very much on the
penalty structure, that is, the rigor of its enforcement and the extent to which participants
in black market exchange transactions are apprehended and prosecuted. Nevertheless, it is
useful to know parallel market rates (and their deviations) if only to set upper limits for28
what the Bank's Regional staff sometimes advocate as rates to replace official rates in those
cases where IEC and the Region agree that official rates differ egregiously from transaction
rates,
Table 6:  Frequency Distribution of Deviation of Parallel/Black
Market Rates from Official Rates (percent)
Deviation  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  LqB
0-10  49.4  44.3  53.8  57.7  48.7  49.4  48.1  40.5  34.2  29.5  33.9  37.1  28.6  28.
11-20  10.1  13.9  9.0  6.4  12.8  12.7  10.1  10.1  11.4  14.8  13.6  9.7  163  17.
21-30  63  5.1  7.7  5.1  6.4  7.6  63  3.8  63  9.8  3.4  14.5  6.1  7.5
31-40  2.5  5.1  2.6  5.1  2.6  3.8  2.5  1.3  5.1  6.6  6.8  1.6  4.1  5.7
41-40  8.9  5.1  1.3  1.3  2.6  13  5.1  8.9  3.8  1.6  1.7  1.6  10.2  5.7
51-60  0.0  1.3  1.3  1.3  5.1  0.0  3.8  8.9  5.1  1.6  1.7  4.8  0.0  3.8
61-70  2.5  1.3  3.8  1.3  3.8  5.1  3.8  3.8  13  1.6  6.8  0.0  4.1  3.8
71-80  2.5  2.5  2.6  3.8  2.6  2.5  2.5  5.1  2.5  4.9  1.7  1.6  0.0  0.0
81-90  1.3  2.5  1.3  3.8  3.8  0.0  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.6  1.7  0.0  0.0  0.0
91-100  5.1  1.3  1.3  1.3  0.0  3.8  0.0  1.3  1.3  3.3  3.4  0.0  2.0  1.9
>  100  11.4  17.7  15.4  12.8  11.5  13.9  16.5  15.2  27.8  24.6  25.4  29.0  28.6  26.
No. of
Countries  79  79  78  78  78  79  79  79  79  61  59  62  49  53
Deviations  27  29  23  24  25  24  28  36  38  28  29  24  24  25
>  30%
Sources: 1975-1983:  Pick's World Currency Yearbook (various issues);
1984-1988:  Financial Times International  Reports: Statistical Market Letter (weekly issues)
Countries for Review and Adjustment  for Parallel Rates
45.  Table 7 below shows countries with egregious (say, 30 percent or greater) deviations
between the black marKet and official rates. They represent that set of countries for which
the appropriateness  of the official rate as a general conversion factor merit further  review
and adjustments, if deemed necessary. Also, a closer look at the deviations of the black or29
parallel market rates from the official exchange rates reveals half of the countries with such
egregious deviations are  characterized by the  maintenance of dual or multiple exchange
systems (see Table 7 below). The significance  of these relatively large deviations is
Table 7:  Ratio of Parallel/Black  Market  to Official
and Atlas  Exchange Rates
Black to Official Rate  Total  Trade
(Official  =  1.00)  % GDP
1987  1988  (Avg.1987-88)
Algeria  7.64  na  28.7
Romania  /1  5.70  6.42  na
Syrian Arab  Rep.  5.66  1.98  31.5
Burma  4.32  4.50  na
Afghanistan  /1  3.95  na  na
Iraq  3.76  3.76  na
P  Poland /1  3.40  4.10  41.6
*  Egypt /1  3.13  3.58  50.0
Zambia  3.06  3.04  64.0
Bangladesh /1  2.91  2.84  23.2
a  Nicaragua  2.81  na  na
Ethiopia  2.54  2.54  33.9
Zimbabwe  2.42  2.83  51.5
Libya  2.34  '2.41  na
P  Peru /1  2.27  2.27  23.8
G  Guyana  2.05  3.58  149.5
Venezuela  /1  1.93  2.32  46.8
Tunisia  1.68  1.62  78.2
South Africa  /1  1.61  1.14  50.8
*  Paraguay  /1  1.46  1.69  54.6
Trinidad  and Tobago  /1  1.46  1.33  72.5
* Hungary  /1  1.46  1.43  74.4
* Nigeria  1.44  1.58  53.0
Morocco  1.42  1.46  49.6
* Kenya  1.32  1.32  44.8
Zaire  1.31  0.86  73.9
* Countries  identified  in IMF,  Annual  Report  on Exchange Arrangements
and  Exchange  Restrictions  as maintaining multiple  exchange systems.
/1  Principal, secondary or tertiary  rates  for these countries are  available in IFS.30
further heightened by the importance of total external trade in GDP. It is clear that the
combination of large  deviations and  large  trade  shares in  GDP  provides prima facie
evidence that adjustment of official exchange rate as a general purpose conversion factor
should be accorded serious cor,sideration.
46.  IEC has expanded its collection of various exchange rates to include parallel or black
market rates. For Operational Guideline purposes, black market rates have zero weights.
They are used only to shed light on conversion issues and set outer limits on any possible
adjustment of conversion factors.
47.  Should  "unofficial" exchange rates, in  addition to  officially recognized multiple
exchange rates, be used to obtain reasonably meaningful estimates for per capita GNP?
In principle, the conversion factor used by the Bank to transform major macroeconomic
aggregates in  local  currencies into  a  common numeraire  should  reflect the  effective
transaction rates used in international transactions. In addition, for the resulting overall
conversion factor to  be analytically relevant and meaningful, the  major macroeconomic
variables, such as GNP, should reflect consistently  the relative prices implicit  in the effective
transaction rates believed to apply. Therefore, the effective transaction  rates should refer
to  all  the  various rates  at which foreign transactions take  place, including "unofficial"
exchange rates. Failure to attach any importance to the unofficial rates which are known
to prevail (because they are "unofficial"  or "illegal")  gives rise to both price and conversion
distortions which will tend to show  up in erratic trends in derived per capita GNP estimates.31
It  should  be  stressed,  however, that  consistency must prevail,  that  is,  the  effective
transaction rate encompassing all (official and "unofficial")  rates becomes a relevant and
meaningful conversion factor only if the  macroeconomic aggregates in  local currencies
reflect  consistently  the relative prices implicit in the effective transaction rates believed to
apply (cf.para.10).
48.  The Harvard Institute for International Development-sponsored  workshop  on parallel
markets in developing countries provided clear indications that  "increasing attention to
parallel markets in general has arisen in response to price controls,"  ..........  that  "although
economists increasingly  recognize the importance of parallel markets, many policy analysts
treat  them  as an inconvenience to  be avoided,"  ..........  and, in the face of pervasive price
controls  and  market  interventions by governments in  developing countries,  "parallel
markets can compromise the policy  prescriptions that are part of most reform packages and
can lead to different interpretations of the benefits of reform."  20
49.  While recognizing  the importance of parallel or black markets in many developing
countries the Bank, however, should be mindful of the risks of using statistics pertaining to
what are in many co-antries  illegal activities.
2  A  summary  of the  major  contributions  to  the  workshop  on  parallel  markets  in developing  countries
sponsored by the Harvard Institute for International  Development  (November 11-12, 1988) is found in Christine
Jones  and  Michael  Roemer,  "Editors'  Introduction:Modeling  and  Measuring  Parallel  Markets  in Developing
Markets,'  World  Development, Vol.  17,  No.  12  (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  Institute  for  International
Development,  December,  1989); pp.  1861-1870.32
V. PURCHASING  POWER  PARITY
as CONVERSION  FACTORS
Purchasing  Power  Parity (PPP)
50.  The purchasing power parity (PPP) theory of exchange rates  argues that the foreign
exchange value of a national currency is largely determined by the purchasing power of that
currency relative to the purchasing power of foreign currencies. 2"  Two aspects of the PPP
doctrine deserve attention. The more fundamental element focuses upon the manner in
which the relation between national price levels leads to market-clearing exchange rates for
national  currencies. This  argument  hypothesizes that  changes in  relative  price  levels
dominate exchange rates changes rather than vice versa. Thus PPP involves a relationship
between a country's foreign exchange rate, on the one hand, and its price level or price
movemcnt compared to the foreign price level or movement, on the  other, that is, the
exchange rate is determined by the level of prices in the domestic currency compared to
that abroad, that changes in the exchange rate are determined by changes in these price
levels, and that the percentage change in the exchange rate per month, quarter, or year is
determined by inflation at home relative to that abroad over these time intervals.  Thus
in the PPP, relative inflation movements are offset by exchange rate changes. PPP may be
21  A comprehensive  discussion  of various aspects of the purchasing power parity doctrine is given in
Lawrence H. Officer,  Purchasing Power Parity and Exchange  Rates (Greenwich,  Connecticut:  Jai Press, 1982);
see a._  Alan C. Shapiro, "What Does Purchasing  Power Parity Mean?"  Journal of Money  and Finance, Vol.2,
No. 3, December 1983,  pp. 295-318.33




E, = the exchange rate expressed as the number of domestic currency units per unit
of local currency at time t;
Pd  =  domestic price index at time t; and
Pt = foreign price index at time t.
Alternatively, the purchasing power parity of the domestic currency with respect to  the
foreign currency can be expressed as:
(P4t/Ptt)  * R.
where Ro is the actual or "market" or current exchange rate in the base year "o" and not
necessarily  equal to the "equilibrium"  rate defined in any manner. Purchasing  power parities
for Egypt are shown in Table 1 above.
51.  PPPs are distinct from and not necessarily  equal to the "equilibrium"  exchange rate,
defined in any manner. They do not measure the degree of overvaluation  or undervaluation
of a currency. In the absence of other influences PPPs can, however, serve as a guide to the
levels of equilibrium exchange rates between the various currencies provided that the base
period chosen is one in which equilibrium values prevailed.'  PPPs become all the more
X  William  P. Culbertson,  'Purchasing  Power  Parity and Black-Market  Exchange  Rates," Economic  Inquiry,
Vol. 13, June 1975,  p. 287.34
applicable  if  trade  restrictions  and  exchange  controls  are  sufficiently high  and
comprehensive to distort the official exchange rate.
PPP and Data Conversion
52.  Probably the most generally accepted use of PPP is as a conversion factor, given the
simplicity of the PPP approach, the  ease in calculating relative PPP measures, and the
intuitive appeal  of PPP  as  a  valid theory. International comparison of real  output  in
different countries  requires  that  the  conversion rate  reflect relative  price  levels. The
absolute PPP measure ( E, = Pdt/PLt)  founded on the GDP price level has been used for
the  currency conversion of the  national accounts data at finely disaggregated levels of
expenditure by Kravis.'
What Price Measure  to Use in PPP Computations
53.  The individual prices used to construct the price level or price index for PPP must
be presumed to reflect accurately the prices at  vhich transactions occur in a free market.
In a multicommodity  world with relative price changes, differing consumption preferences
across countries, nontraded goods, transportation costs, and trade barriers, the PPPs are
likely to be distorted so that they do not reflect true relative purchasing power.
'  Irving  B. Kravis,  Alan  W. Heston,  and  Robert  Summers,  International  Comparisons  of Real Product  and
Purchasing  Power  (Baltimorc,MD:  Johns  Hopkins  University,  1978).35
54.  Suggestions  to the appropriate price index to use in computing  and testing PPPs have
"ranged from the price of the least traded commodity -- labor -- to an index of nontraded
goods only, to the broadest domestic index available, to an index comprised only of traded
goods, to individual prices of traded commodities."  24  Comparison of unit labor costs is
beset with measurement problems. Among these are measurements reflecting differences
in types and quality of labor; and adjustment for differences in productivity (traded goods
sector only, nontraded goods sector only, or combination of both?). Price indices based on
internaticnally traded goods (export and import price indices) are limited to a small class
of commodities, relative to all goods and services, and are  therefore subject to variations
that presumably would not be present in a broad-based price measure. Also, traded and
nontraded goods are not unvarying collections of commodities. There is never a definite
group of commodities that can be exported. Changes in the structure of the economy or
changes in profitability may widen or restrict the group of traded/exportable  goods.In the
same vein wholesale price indices (WPI) are also heavily weighted with traded goods. The
use of cost-of-living  indices (COL) requires that the weighting pattern  be the same for
each country's price level, that is, taking a common basket of goods with a standard system
of weighting. The  PPP theory essentially refers to  the  internal value of the  currencies
concerned, and variations in  this value can be measured best  by general index figures
representing as far as possible the whole mass of commodities (and services), traded and
nontraded, marketed in the country. This is reflected in the GDP deflator which is the price
'  Alan C. Shapiro, "What Does  Purchasing Power Parity Mean?" Journal of International Money and
Finance, Vol. 2, No. 3 , December 1983; pp. 295-318.36
concept  with  a firm analytical  foundation  in PPP theory. 2'  In essence,  a PPP measure  based
on the GDP deflator  is advocated  since  each country's  own  pattern of production  provides
the ideal source of weights  to construct  its price measure  for PPP computation.
See Lawrence H. Officer, The Relationship  Between  Absolute and Relative Purchasing  Power Parity,,
Review  of Economics  and Statistics, Vol. 60, November 1978,  pp. 562-56837
VI. TRADE  and EXCHANGE  TAXES  and CONTROLS
55.  Countries facing  unsustainable external balance and payments difficulties,  often react
by imposing a variety of policy instruments and restrictions on the use of foreign exchange
and/or  to protect industry-specific  industries. These include price measures such as tariffs,
import  surcharges, advance  deposits for imports,  export taxes, subsidies and  multiple
exchange rates, as well as non-price measures such as quotas, licensing,  voluntary restraint
agreements, and exchange controls. Over time and as a result of these ad hoc decisions
rather  than an overall policy design, the trade  regulations become increasing complex. 2'
Price measures, in general, can be expressed in terms of tariffs. Specific taxes or import
surcharges are  added to  tariffs; the tariff equivalent of advance deposits is given by the
interest foregone on loans designed to make the deposits; export taxes and import subsidies
are regarded as negative tariffs; and the premium in the secondary exchange market can
also be regarded as a tariff. In the case of nonprice measures, permissible levels of imports
are set directly in quantitative terms. By restricting the amount of imported commodities
made available on the home market, these measures lead to a rise in the domestic prices
of the  commodities in question. The excess of domestic price  over world price  can be
regarded as an "implicit tariff."
26 For a comprehensive  description  of exchange  rate  arrangements  and  exchange  controls,  and  changes in
these as they  occur,  see International Monetary  Fund,  Annual  Report  on Exchange  Arrangements  and Exchange
Restrictions  (WashingtonD.C.:  Internatioual Monetary  Fund, 1989).38
56.  The nature and extent of price measures and nonprice measure restrictions can alter
relative  prices  and  profitability  between  sectors,  leading  to  distortions  in  resource
allocations. Frequent increases in tariffs and import surcharges, the imposition or tightening
of quantitative restrictions and resorting to multiple exchange rates for balance of payments
purposes mean that the actual value of traded goods do not reflect the outcome of market
forces.  Tariffs  and  nontariff  barriers  and  subsidy measures  represent  attempts  by
governments to offset the negative effects of the overvalued exchange rate by influencing
domestic relative prices and, therefore, on import demand and export supply.
Trade Taxes on Gross Output and Value-Added
57.  The impact of taxes and subsidies  on relative prices and the profitability of industry-
specific activities (with its attendant resource allocation implications) should take note not
only of the tariff (and subsidy) structure on the final product but also on material inputs.
From the point of view of the producer, not only tariffs and other protective measures on
the final output matter but also tariffs levied on material inputs because the latter would
reduce the domestic value-added. In export industries the increase in costs due to tariffs on
material inputs may be compensated by the provision of export subsidies. Balassa concludes
that tariffs and subsidies on gross output and intermediate inputs permit domestic industries
to operate with a value-added higher than under tariff-free trade. 27
27  Bela Balassa, 'Industrial Protection in Developing  Countries," Report No.EC-175,  (Unpublished; The
World Bank, June 1980).39
Effects of Tariffs and Subsidies on Conversion  Factors
58.  The  imposition of  tariffs, surcharges and  subsidies represents  the  use of  "fiscal
proxies" for exchange rate changes. Simply  stated, such a policy may be designed to force
imports competing with domestically traded goods to enter  the country at a depreciated
exchange rate (i.e.; at a higher domestic currency price) and/or to allow producers to export
at a depreciated  rate while preserving a higher exchange rate  for other transactions. In
essence, the  imposition of import  tariffs  and  export subsidies means that,  effectively,
importers pay more and exporters receive more local currency units per dollar than they
would under free trade. It appears, then, that the price (i.e.; conversion factor) paid for or
received under  tariffs and export subsidies tends to overvalue the  domestic currency as
compared to the tariff-free trade situation and, in the process, raises the relative price of
traded to nontraded goods.'  On the other hand export taxes (and import subsidies) are
regarded as negative tariffs.
59.  The  extent  of  the  implications on  international  data  comparability  and  on
comparative analysis resulting  from  the  reliance  on  the  official exchange  rate  as  a
conversion factor depends on the incidence and magnitude of price measures and nonprice
measures in international trade.'  How prevalent are import and export taxes and subsidies
in developing countries?  Are tariff structures and schedules prohibitive? This is examined
below.
28 See para. 15 above for simple numerical examples  illustrating  this.
D  An overview  of current developments in trade and exchange controls is presented in International
Monetary Fund, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Controls, (Washington,D.C.:  International Monetary
Fund, 1989);  and International Monetary Fund, "Developments  in International Exchange  and Trade Systems,"
World Economic  and Fir, .ncial Surveys (Washington,D.C,:  International Monetary Fund, September 1989).40
Incidence  of Trade Taxes and Exchange  Controls
60.  The Fund's Annual Report  on Exchange  Arrangements  and Exchange  Restrictions
reports that, in general, most developing countries had adopted, or were edging towards
more  liberal trade  policies at the  end of the  198'-, than  they had  before  the external
balance difficulties of the late  1970s, albeit from a considerably restrictive base. On the
other hand the industrial economies, especially the EEC and the US, have intensified their
recourse  to  quantitative controls. Given their  varying forms and  purposes and  lack of
transparency, it  has  been  difficult to  assess the  incidence and  quantitative  impact of
nontariff barriers on trade. They take many forms: import licensing, quotas, quantitative
restrictions in the form of outright prohibition, voluntary export restraint arrangements,
government  procurement  and  state  trading  practices  that  may  have  some  hidden
discrimination against  specific foreign suppliers, etc. But  the  end  result  of tariffs and
quantitative controls is the same: they raise the  price of imported goods in a particular
market relative to prices without restrictions and relative to world prices.
61.  Table 8 below shows the frequency distribution of developing countries by the size
of the tariff rates, measured here as total, import, and export taxes as a percent of total,
imports, and exports of goods and nonfactor services, respectively.'  It is clear that many
developing countries still resort to tariffs and import surcharges to deal with acute balance
of payments difficulties. Duties on overall trade of 10 percent or greater are registered in
about one-third of developing countries for which data are available. Other notable features
30 Since trade flows and taxes used here are at the aggregated level, the implicit assumption is made that
the tariff barrier, which in fact applies only to certain product groups, affects all trade.41
in Table 2 are: (a) most of the taxes on international trade and transactioins  are imposed
to curtail imports; (b) two-thirds of the developing countries for which data are available
impose implicit import tariff rates of 10 percent or more; and (c) the duty rate on exports
are relatively low though its incidence is still high.
Table 8:  Distribution of 'Implicit Tariff Rates"
*Implicit  Tariff  Rate  (Total  Duties % Total Goods  & Nonfactor  Services)
Range(%)  1980 (%)  1981 (%)  1982 (%)  1983 (%)  1984 (%)  1985 (%)  1986 (%)  1987 (%)
0.0-5.0  21 (26.3)  23 (28.4)  24 (31.6)  22 (28.6)  23 (28.4)  20 (26.3)  19 (29.7)  8 (27.6)
5.1-10.0  33 (41.3)  42 (51.9)  32 (42.1)  37 (48.1)  35 (43.2)  38 (50.0)  30 (46.9)  11 (379)
10.1-15.0  17 (21.3)  11 (13.6)  14 (18A)  12 (15.6)  16 (19.8)  10 (13.2)  9 (14.1)  8 (27.6)
15.1-20.0  7 (8.8)  S (6.2)  5 (6.6)  4 (5.2)  4 (4.9)  5 (6.6)  3 (4.7)  0 (0.0)
20.1-25.0  1 (1.2)  0 (0.0)  1 (1.3)  1 (1.3)  3 (3.7)  3 (3.9)  1 (1.6)  1 (3.4)
>25.0  1 (1.2)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  1 (1.3)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  2  (3.1)  1 (3.4)
Total  80  81  76  77  81  76  64  29
"Imnilcit  lmnnort  Tariff Rate" (Imnort Duties % ImRorts Goods & Nonfactor Services)
Range (%)  1980 (%)  1981 (%)  1982 (%)  1983 (%)  1984 (%)  1985 (%)  1986 (%)  1987 (%)
0.0-5.0  S (7.6)  7 (10.4)  5 (7.8)  6 (9.5)  7 (10.3)  7 (11.1)  4 (7.5)  1 (4.3)
5.1-10.0  9 (13.4)  9 (13A)  11 (17.2)  7 (11.1)  7 (10.3)  7 (11.1)  6 (11.3)  0 (0.0)
10.1-15.0  11 (16.4)  15 (22.4)  16 (25.0)  16 (25.4)  15 (22.1)  12 (19.0)  10 (18.9)  7 (30.4)
15.1-20.0  16 (23.9)  21 (31.3)  14 (21.9)  19 (30.2)  17 (25.0)  17 (27.0)  17 (32.1)  5 (21.7)
20.1-25.0  12 (17.9)  8 (11.9)  11 (17.2)  9 (14.3)  11 (16.2)  12 (19.0)  6 (11.3)  5 (21.7)
>25.0  14 (20.9)  7 (IOA)  7 (10.9)  6 (9.5)  11 (16.2)  8 (12.7)  10 (189)  s (21.7)
Total  67  67  64  63  68  63  53  23
'Implicit  Exnort Tariff  Rate" (Exnort Duties % Exvorts  Goods & Nonfactor  Services)
Range (%)  1980 (%x0)  1981 (%)  1982 (%)  1983 (%)  1984 (%)  1985 (%)  1986 (%)  1987 (%)
0.0-5.0  40 (63.5)  48 (77A)  48 (78.9)  46 (76.7)  53 (80.3)  50 (82.0)  40 (81.6)  18 (78.3)
5.1-10.0  16 (25A)  11 (17.7)  11 (18.0)  9 (15.O)  8 (12.2)  6 (9.8)  4 (8.2)  2 (8.7)
10.1-15.0  0 (0.0)  1 (1.6)  0  (0.0)  3 (5.0)  1 (1.5)  2 (3.3)  2 (4.1)  1 (4.3)
15.1-20.0  3 (4.8)  1 (1.6)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  1 (1.5)  0 (0.0)  1 (2.0)  1 (4.3)
20.1-25.0  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  1 (1.6)  1 (1.6)  2 (3.0)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)
>25.0  4 (6.3)  1 (1.6)  1 (1.6)  1 (1.6)  1 (1.5)  3 (49)  2 (4.1)  1 (4.3)
Total  63  62  61  60  66  61  49  23
Source: Taxes on international trade are from the IMF Govt. Fmance statistics  file;
Exports and Imports of goods and nonfactor services are from IEC data file.42
62.  Table 9 lists the countries in the Fund's Annual  Report  on Exchange  Arrangements
and Exchange  Restrictions with "cost-related import restrictions" (import surcharges and
advance import deposits) as features of the trade and exchange system, as well as other
countries not included in the Fund's list but with import and export duties of at least 10
percent of imports and exports of goods and nonfactor services, respectively.  The "implicit
average import tariff rate" varies substantially  among the countries, ranging from 1 percent
in Greece to 45 percent in India. It should also be noted that these average taxation rates
on  imports  often  mask  sorme fairly high  tariffs  protecting  individual  import-sensitive
industries, although in practice the bulk of transactions may take place within a relatively
narrow tariff schedule.
63.  The data in Table 9 reinforce the features evident in Table 8:  that most trade taxes
are imposed on imports; their incidence is dispersed in both low- and mid-income  countries;
and  the  implicit tariff  rate  in  low-income countries  (e.g.,Bangladesh, Gambia,  India,
Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan, Sierra Leone) averages 25 percent, which is twice that imposed
by the middle-income economies.43
Table 9: Incidence of Import  and  Export  Taxes
in Selected Developing Countries
Import  Duties  Export Duties  Total Duties
Country  % Imports GNFS  % Export GNFS  % Tcti CN 
X  Argentina  36.2 /1984  8.9 /1984  9.2 /1984
GFS  Bangladesh  26.9 /1985  6.1 /1985  17.9 /1985
X  Belize  21.7 /1985  1.0 /1985  11.2 /1985
GFS  Botswana  17.0 /1986  1.0 /1985  7.4 /1986
X  Burkina  Faso  15.2 /1987  1.6 /1987  10.5 /1987
GFS  Burundi  15.6 /1986  32.9 /1986  21.9 /1986
GFS  Cameroon  19.0 /1987  2.5 /1987  9.3 /1987
X  China  na  na  na
X  Colombia  20.1 /1987  1.0 /1987  8.3 /1987
GFS  Comoros  21.1 /1987  13.2 /1986  13.8 /1987
X  Congo  7.7 /1980  1.0 /1980  3.8 /1980
X  Costa Rica  20.8 /1986  5.5 /1986  7.4 /1986
X  Cote D'Ivoire  31.3 /1985  5.6 /1985  9.7 /1985
X  Cyprus  na  na  na
X  Djibouti  2.6 /1986  1.0 /1986  1.6 /1986
X  Dominican  Rep.  20.5 /1986  3.2 /1986  9.9 /1986
X  Ecuador  15.6 /1985  1.0 /1985  6.2 /1985
X  Egypt  18.2 /1987  1.0 /1987  11.5 /1987
GFS  El Salvador  19.1 /1987  10.6 /1987  6.9 /1987
GFS  Fiji  15.8 /1986  7.7 /1986
GFS  Gabon  19.3 /1985  1.1 /1985  6.7 /1985
GFS  Gambia  25.5 /1987  1.0 /1987  13.6 /1987
GFS  Ghana  10.1 /1987  17.4 /1987  13.5 /1987
X  Greece  1 0 /1985  na  na
X  Grena.a  na  na
X  Guatemala  11.1 /1982  3.8 /1982  4.5 /1982
X  Guinea  na  na  na
GFS  Guinea-Bissau  na  na  24.1 /1987
X  Haiti  11.9 /1987  1.3 /1987  6.8 /1987
GFS  Honduras  20.2 /198i  6.4 /1981  8.1 /1981
X  India  45.7 /1987  26.1 /1987
X  Indonesia  3.7 /1987  3.5 /1987  3.6 /1987
X  Iran  Iraq  na  na  11.9 /1985
X  Iraq  na  na  na
X  Israel  na  3.0 /1985
X  Jamaica  na  na  1.6 /1981
X  Jordan  na  na  7.2 /1986
X  Kenya  17.5 /1986  2.6 /1986  7.4 /1986
X  Lebanon  na  na  na
X  Liberia  14.0 /1986  1.1 /1986  6.2 /1986
X  Libya  na  na  na
X  Madagascar  15.0 /1982  3.8 /1982  8.1 /1982
X  Malawi  15.3 /1986  1.0 /1986  7.6 /1986
GFS  Mali  14.6 /1987  3.6 /1987  8.5 /1986
X  Mauritius  19.5 /1988  3.2 /1988  8.2 /1988
GFS  Myanmar  na  na  14.6 /1985
X  Nepal  12.0 /1984  1.0 /1984  7.2 /1984
X  Netherland  Ant.  na  na  na44
Table 9 (Cont):  Incidence of Import  and  Export  Taxes
in Selected Developing Countries
Import  Duties  Export Duties  Total Duties
/1  Country  % Imports GNFS  %  Export GNFS  % Total GNFS
X  Nicaragua  na  na  na
X  Pakistan  29.5 /1986  1.6 /1986  17.7 /1986
X  Panama  11.8 /1986  1.0 /1986  5.3 /1986
X  Paraguay  3.4 /1986  1.0 /1986  2.1 /1986
X  Peru  21.7 /1986  2.7 /1986  10.5 /1986
X  Philippines  12.0 /1986  1.0 /1986  4.9 /1986
GFS  Poland  14.8 /1987  1.1 /1987  6.4 /1987
GFS  St. Lucia  14.9 /1986  1.0 /1986  7.6 /1986
GFS  St. Vincent  16.6 /1986  1.0 /1986  8.6 /1986
GFS  Senegal  15.8 /1984  1.0 /1984  8.8 /1984
X  Sierra  Leone  28.9 /1987  1.0 /1987  13.2 /1987
X  Somalia  17.8 /1978  1.1 /1978  12.5 /1978
X  South Africa  3.6 /1985  1.0 /'985  1.4 /1985
GFS  Sri Lanka  21.1 /1988  3.9 /1988  10.7 /1988
X  Sudan  25.1 /1981  5.8 /1981  17.5 /1982
X  Suriname  16.8 /1986  1.0 /1986  8.5 /1986
GFS  Swaziland  14.8 /1986  1.0  /1986  7.9 /1986
X  Syria  8.9 /1987  1.0 /1986  5.8 /1986
X  Thailand  11.3 /1987  1.0 /1987  5.3 /1987
GFS  Togo  19.5 /1986  1.0 /1986  11.0 /1986
X  Trinidad  7.8 /1981  na  3.5 /1981
GFS  Tunisia  23.3 /1984  1.0  /1984  13.1 /1984
X  Turkey  5.9 /1987  1.0 /1987  3.1 /1987
GFS  Uganda  3.1 /1986  32.6 /1986  16.0 /1986
X  Uruguay  18.1  /1987  1.0  /1987  7.5 /1987
X  Vanuatu  18.2 /1986  1.6  /1986  12.5 /1986
GFS  Venezuela  25.0 /1986  na  12.5 /1986
X  Yemen  AR  14.8 /1987  na  13.2 /1987
X  Yemen  PDR  na  na  na
X  Yugoslavia  13.2 /1987  na  6.5 /1987
GFS  Zaire  19.7 /1986  5.1 /1986
X  Zambia  24.0 /1988  7.4 /1988  8.5 /1987
X  Zimbabwe  16.4 /1985  na  8.0 /1985
Total  81
X  = 56
GFS = 25
Sources:  IMF, Annual  Report  on Exchange  Arrangements  and Exchange  Restrictions,  1989;
Import and exports duties are from the IMF file on Government Finance Statistics.
1/  "  X "denotes  countries identified  in the Fund's Annual  Report  on  Exchange  Arrangements  and  Exchange
Restrictions  with "cost-related  import restrictions" (import surcharges and advance import deposits) as
features of the trade and exchange  system.
" GFS  n  denotes other countries not included in the X list with import and export duties of at least 10 %
of imports and exports of GNFS, respectively45
"Trade  Tax-Effective'  Conversion  Factors
64.  Given the high incidence and relatively high implicit tariff rates on imports (and
heavy export taxes in a few countries) shown in Tables 8 and 9, there are strong reasons
to examine conversion factors that reflect the  impact of suibstantial  tariffs and subsidies.
A  priori, it  is  reasonable  to  expect  that  countries  with  cost-related  restrictions  on
international transactions would exhibit large deviations between the transaction rate and
the official exchange rate. In situations where tariffs and subsidies are widely  dispersed and
substantial, the price (i.e.; conversion factor) paid for or received by transactors differs from
the price denoted by the official exchange rate.  In essence, we need to compute  so-called
"tax-effective"  import and export prices (i.e.; conversion factors) as well as a conversion
factor that represents an overall "trade-tax  effective"  con"ersion factor. Significant  deviations
of the overall "trade-tax effective"  conversion factor from the official exchange rate shouid
be taken as a signal that  further review of the  adequacy of official exchange rate  as a
conversion factor merits consideration.
65.  The  majority of developing countries (90 percent)  for which data  are  available
impose export duties considerably less than 10 percent (see Table 8); that is to say that the
impact of export taxes on the transaction rate is small. Therefore the last column in Table
9 (total duties % total goods and nonfactor services) is a close proxy for the magnitude of
the deviations of the "trade-tax-effective"  conversion factors from the official rates.
66.  Table 10 illustrates an approach towards computing "trade-tax-effective"  conversion
factors. Because data on subsidies are not available, the  computational approach shown46
below does not take into account the impact of subsidies.  To illustrate the a priori reasoning
that countries with high cost-related restrictions on international transactions would exhibit
larger deviations between the transaction rate and the official rate, Table 10 illustrates the
impact in  two differing situations. India's trade  system is characterized by high price-
measure restrictions, particularly on  imports; the  implicit import tariff  rate  is over  40
percent since the mid-1980s.  On the other hand, the Malaysian trade system is relatively
restriction free. As seen  in Table  10 (indicator K), there  is a  marked difference in the
magnitude of the deviation of the "trade-tax effective"  conversion factor (ITXR)  from the
official exchange rate  between  the  two countries.  In  Malaysia, the  conversion  factor
effectively used in trade  is virtually no different from the  official exchange rate; on  the
other hand, in India the conversion factor in international transactions is some 25 percent
more depreciated than that represented by the official exchange rate.
67.  It is apparently clear that where we know that a country's trade and payments system
is very restrictive, the use of the official exchange rate as a general conversion factor needs
farther examination. In such a situation, attempts should be made to estimate a conversion
factor  that takes into account the  impact of the  trade  restrictions (e.g., the  "trade tax-
effective" conversion factor). It is suggested that this be done for countries shown in the
Fund's Annual Report on Exchange  Arrangements  and Exchange Restrictions  as having
"cost-related import restrictions", supplemented with a country list (other than those listed
in the above-mentioned Fund document) with high import and export duties.47
Table  10:  'Tax-Effective'  Conversion  Factors  for Imports and Exports
INDIA: HIGH TARIFFS/SURCHARGES  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Basic  Data-
A.  Total  Duties  % Total GNFS  /;  15.52  17.17  20.17  19.06  19.1524.24  27.56  26.09
B.  Import  Duties  % Import  GNFS  /1  24.66  28.12  33.63  32.43  32.94  39.74  46.06  45.10
C.  Export  Duties %  ExportS GNFS /1  1.33  0.60  0.63  0.64  0.52  0.53  0.56  0.43
D.  Imports  GNFS % Total  GNFS  60.83  60.22  59.22  57.96  57.46  60.47  59.33  57.46
E.  Exports GNFS % Total  GNFS  39.17  39.70  40.78  42.04  42.54  39.53  40.67  42.54
F.  IFS  RF  7.8629  8.6585  9.4551  10.0990  113630  123690  12.6110  129
G.  EXR_ATLAS  7.8930  8.9290  9.6280  103120  11.8870  12.2370  12.7870  13.0000
DERIVED INDICATORS
H.  ExRate."Import-Tax"  Effective (ITXR)  il  9.8017  11.0928  12.6346  13.3738  15.1057  17.2844  18.4198  18.8075
1.  ExRate."Export-Tax"  Effective (ETXR)  /1  7.7580  8.6066  9.3955  10.0345  11.3034  12.3029  12.5403  12.9068
J.  ExRate.-Trade-Tax"  Effective  (MTXR) /1  9.0011  10.1038  11.3135  11.9699  13.4883  15.3150  16.0286  162$
K.  Ratio: TTXR/IFS  RF  1.1448  1.1669  1.1966  1.1853  1.1870  1.2382  1.2710  12573
L.  Ratio: TTXR/EXR  ATLAS  1.1404  1.1316  1.1751  1.1608  1.1347  1.2515  1.2535  1236
M.  Index Real  Effective ExRate  100.00  111.96  124.35  128.09  137.27  150.20  151.20  14790
MALAYSIA:  LOW TARIFFS/SURCHARGES  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Basic  Data
A.  Duties  % Total GNFS  /1  7.71  7.00  5.83 5.93  5.64  5.37  4.17  3.54
B.  Import  Duties  % Import  GNFS  /1  7.06  6.66  6.21  6.51  6.48  6.53  5.70  4.87
C.  Export  Duties  % Export  GNFS /1  8.34  7.38  5.40  5.28  4.84  4.32  2.80  2.50
D.  Imports  GNFS  % Total  GNFS  48.89  52.79  53.94  52.64  49.11  47.55  47.10  43.91
E.  Exports GNFS % Total  GNFS  51.11  47.21  46.06  47.36  50.89  52.45  52.90  56.09
F.  IFS  RF  2.1769  2.3041  2.3354  2.3213  2.3436  2.4831  2.5814  25Li
G.  EXR_ATLAS  2.1769  23041  2.3354  23213  2.3436  2.4831  2.5814  2515%
DERIVED INDICATORS
H.  ExRate."Import-Tax"  Effective (ITXR)  /1  23305  2.4576  2.4803  2.4724  2.4954  2.6419  2.7270  26L
1.  ExRate."Export-Tax"  Effective (ETXR)  /1  1.9954  2.1341  2.2093  2.1988  2.2301  23728  2.5077  245)
J.  ExRate."Trade-Tax" Effective  (lTXR)  /1  2.1593  23049  2.3555  2.3429  23604  2.5008  2.6110  253S
K.  Ratio: TIXR/IFS  RF  0.9919  1.0003  1.0086  1.0093  1.0072  1.0084  1.0120  1074
L.  Ratio: TTXR/EXR  ATLAS  0.9919  1.0003  1.0086  1.0093  1.0072  1.0072  1.0115  UI05
M.  Index Real  Effective ExRate  100.00  109.77  115.12  114.05  116.63  124.79  129.24  128.88
COMPUTATION PROCEDURES:  /1
H.  ExRate."Import-Tax"  Effective  =  IF x (1 +B)]
1.  ExRate."Export-Tax"  Effective  =  IF x (1-C)]
J.  ExRate.'Trade-Tax"  Effective  =  [(H x D)  + (I x E)]
/1  Because data on subsidies are not available, their  impact on the respective conversion factors is not reflected  in the
computations  shown above.48
Table 10 above illustrates the type  of data IEC staff is expected to culP  from various Bank
and Fund documents to  support the estimation of an alternative conversion factor that
gives some recognition to price-measure restrictions.
Deviations  of "Trade  Tax-Effective'  Exchange  Rates
68. Table 11 below shows  the distribution of the deviations of the "trade tax-effective"  rate
from the official rate. The distribution sh'own  here is very similar to that of total  duties
imposed on trade in goods and nonfactor services shown earlier in Table 8. In Table  11,
some 30 percent  of developing countries for which data  are  available show deviations
greater  than  10 percent in the "trade tax-effective"  conversion factor; similarly, Table  8
shows .hat the "implicit  tariff rate" of 10 percent or greater is imposed in some 30 percent
of developing countries.
Table  11:  Distribution  of Deviations of "Trade Tax-Effective'
Rate  from Official Rate
Range (%)  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  19,80  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1M7
0.0-1.0  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  3  2  2  2  3  6
1.1-5.0  17  21  17  18  18  19  20  22  19  19  17  14  6
5.1-10.0  32  35  33  30  30  31  39  29  33  32  35  27  10
10.1-15.0  15  i6  16  18  15  17  10  12  11  15  8  8  7
15.1-20.0  9  6  5  6  7  7  5  5  3  3  4  1  0
20.1-25.0  2  1  5  2  2  1  0  1  1  3  3  1  0
2r.1-30.0  0  0  1  3  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  1
>.  J0  1  1  1  1  2  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0
Total:  77  81  79  79  76  77  76  73  70  75  70  57  3049
Countries  for Review  and Adjustment  for Trade  Taxes
69.  Table 12 below lists countries 31 with "implicit tariff rates" of at least 10 percent. In
the context of the search for an appropriate general purpose conversion factor, the list
represents the suggested countries for review, and adjustment if necessary, in the official
exchange rate to take into account the cost-related restrictions in the and trade system. It
should be emphasized that in the review  process, Operations staff should be encouraged to
provide data on subsidies if they form a significant part of the trade system.
Table 12: Selected Countries for Review  and Adjustment
of Official Rate for Trade Taxes
'Implicit Tariff  "Implicit  Tariff
Country  Rate" (%)  Country  Rate" (%)
Bangladesh  17.9  /1985  * Pakistan  17.1 /1986
*  Belize  11.2  /1985  * Peru  10.5 /1986
e  Burkina Faso  10.5  /1987  Sierra Leone  13.2 /1987
Burundi  21.6 /1986  * Somalia  12.5 /1978
Comoros  13.8  /1987  Sri Lanka  10.7 /1988
*  Egypt  11.5 /1987  * Sudan  17.5 /1982
Gambia  13.6 /1987  Togo  11.0  /1986
Ghana  13.5  /1987  Tunisia  13.1 /1984
Guinea-Bissau  24.1 /1987  Uganda  16.0 /1986
'India  26.1 /1987  * Vanuatu  12.5 /1986
*  Iran  11.9 /1985  Venezuela  12.5  /1986
Myanmar  14.6  /1985  *  Yemen AR  13.2 /1987
Source: Table 9
* Countries identified in the Fund's Annual Report on Exchange  Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions with "cost-related  import restrictions.'
31  Based on the Fund's 1989  Annual Report on Exchange  Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, and
supplementary  information from the Fund's Government Finance Statistics  file.50
VII. VOLATILITY  in EXCHANGE RATES
and TRADE VOLUMES
70.  In  addition to  taxes and  subsidies and  the  use of multiple exchange systems in
international  trade  directly applicable to  the  conversion of  local currency into foreign
exchange, the conversion factor should also encompass  volatility in exchange rate  and
volume of trade  during the  period in question. The following paragraphs of the  paper
examines  the  merchandise-trade  weighted  conversion  factor  (MWXR)  that  captures
volatility in the exchange rates and traditional cycles  or fluctuations in the volumes of trade
transactions. Because of large variations in the official rate, the MWXR encompasses the
recommendation stated in Section II, para. 13  above: that shorter period data (e.g., quarterly
exchange rates and  trade  volumes) should be used and then  summed to  derive longer
period data, e.g., annual exchange rates and trade volumes.
Merchandise-Weighted  Conversion  Factors
71.  Each average quarterly exchange rate from the IFS is weighted by the respective
shares of the corresponding quarterly total merchandise trade (exports plus imports) in the
annual total trade according to this relationship:51
Q4
MWXR =  RF,
i=Q,
where
MWXR  = merchandise-weighted  conversion factor;
w,  =  merchandise trade weight in Quarter i
(x.  +  mi)
£:(x,  +  mi)
x;  =  merchandise exports in Quarter i;
-I  =  merchandise imports in Quarter i;
RFi  =  official exchange rate in Quarter i;
i  =  Quarter 1,2,3 4
Deviations  of Merchandise-Weighted  Exchange  Rates
72.  The magnitude of the deviations of merchandise-weighted  rates (MWXR) from the
average annual official rates for the period 1980-88  are presented in Table 13.  A closer
examination of the percent deviations of MWXR from the official rate reveals that for most
countries the deviations are relatively minor. Consistently  about 95 percent of the countries
exhibit deviations of less than  5% over the period 1980-88,  as shown in Table 13. Thus, it
is evident from the  results presented in Table  13 that the  MWXRs, in general, do not
reveal anything significant  about the preference order between the MWXR and the official
rate for most countries.52
Table  13:  Distribution  of Deviations
of MWXR  from IFS  RF
Deviation  (%)  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
0  15  14  14  12  9  8  7  10  7
0.1-1.0  62  54  52  53  49  52  59  50  40
1.1-2.0  2  7  7  6  12  9  5  3  7
2.1-3.0  2  2  2  2  3  4  4  4  0
3.14.0  1  2  2  1  0  0  0  3  6
4.1-5.0  0  1  2  0  1  2  0  0  1
5.1-6.0  1  u  0  1  2  0  0  2  0
6.1-7.0  0  0  0  1  2  1  1  0  1
7.1-8.0  0  0  2  1  0  1  0  1  0
8.1-9.0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0
9.1-10.0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  2  0
10.1-15.0  0  2  0  1  1  2  0  2  0
15.1-20.0  0  0  1  2  0  1  2  0  2
20.1-25.0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
25.1-30.0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1
> 30.0  0  0  0  2  1  0  1  0  2
Total  83  83  82  82  82  80  80  77  67
Source: IFS
Countries  for Review  and Adjustment  for Volatility
73.  Nevertheless, any large deviations should be taken as signals that the MWXR could
be the preferred  choice among the two rates.  The results do suggest, however, that for
three countries in particular the use of MWXR, instead of the official exchange rate, merits
consideration. The three countries showing strong deviations are  Argentina, Brazil, and
Yugoslavia.  Any decision on the preference order between MWXR and official rate would
have to take into account relevant country-specific  knowledge, not just the magnitudes of
the deviations between the two rates.53
74.  Argentina offers some interesting observations which account for the relatively large
percent deviations of its MWXR from the official rate.  A closer look at the quarterly
official exchange rate (Table 14 below) reveals significant volatility in the quarterly rates
in the  1980s.
Table  14:  ARGENTINA  --Fluctuating  Quarterly  Exchange
Rates  and Trade  Weights
IFS  Quarterly  Rates  X Change
01  02  03  04  02  Q3  04
....  .....  ..........  ....................  ....  ......  ..  .........  ..................  ...
1980  0.00017 0.00018 0.00019 0.00020  7.0  5.2  3.5
1981  0.00022 0.00038 0.00051 0.00065  71.3  36.5  27.0
1982  0.00103 0.00137 0.00377 0.00420  33.2  176.0  11.4
1983  0.00575 0.00782 0.01073 0.01781  35.9  37.3  66.0
1984  0.02784 0.04118 0.06934 0.13224  47.9  68.4  90.7
1985  0.24952 0.55672 0.80050 0.80050  123.1  43.8  0.0
1986  0.80050 0.84896 0.97216 1.15051  6.1  14.5  18.3
1987  1.40493 1.61000 2.14627 3.41599  14.6  33.3  59.2
1988  4.37877 6.79771  11.18150  12.65240  55.2  64.5  13.2
Trade  Weights  Z  Change
01  Q2  03  Q4  02  Q3  Q4
...............................  .........................................................  ............  .................
1980  0.2172  0.2240  0.2662  0.2926  3.1  18.8  10.0
1981  0.1263  0.2403  0.3309  0.3024  90.2  37.7  -8.6
1982  0.1439  0.1970  0.2455  0.4136  36.9  24.6  68.5
1983  0.1308  0.2002  0.2643  0.4048  53.1  32.0  53.2
1984  0.1071  0.1836  0.2831  0.4262  71.5  54.2  50.5
1985  0.0953  0.2654  0.3336  0.3057  178.3  25.7  -8.4
1986  0.1781  0.2427  0.2876  0.2916  36.3  18.5  1.4
1987  0.1408  0.1903  0.2613  0.4076  35.2  37.3  56.0
1988  0.0897  0.1838  0.3500  0.3765  104.9  90.5  7.6
S Deviations  of MMR  from  IFS  RF
1980  0.7  198513.5
1981  10.2  1986  2.2
1982  18.9  198714.6
1983  17.4  198817.9
1984  27.9
Source:  IFS54
This  is compounded by the  fluctuations in  Argentina's  quarterly  trade  shares where,
traditionally, a  high proportion  of total  trade  occurs in  the  third  and  fourth  quarters.
Together, they account for the large deviations of the merchandise-weighted conversion
factor form the unweighted official exchange rate. A closer look at Table 14 reveals that
the small deviation in MWXR in 1980  is the result of relative stability in exchange rates and
the dispersion of total trade, by quarters, in 1980;  similar observations are seen in 1986.  The
outcome of the high volatility in exchange rates and trade  shares in the  other years is
obvious: large deviations between MTXR and official rate. It  is obvious that while the
official rate encompasses the unweighted exchange rate changes over the entire year, its
suffers from the drawback of not encompassing  the volumes of transactions at each of these
fluctuating rates; hence the need for a weighted conversion factor based on shorter period
(quarterly) data.55
VIII. USE of PERIOD  AVERAGE  EXCHANGE
RATES  in the BANK
75.  In principle, the Bank adopts the unweighted  annual average of the official  exchange
rate  (line rf in  IFS) for conversions between national currency and  U.S. dollar values,
except in those instances  where it was seriously  considered that this rate was "inappropriate"
and  that  consideration of an  alternative conversion factor is warranted  only when the
difference between the official exchange rate and that applying to the average of foreign
transactions is egregiously large.
Shorter  Periods to Longer  Period Rates
76.  Market rates, however,  vary from day to day, but the various types  of data series that
need to be converted to a common currency (e.g.,  GNP, foreign trade, balance of payments,
etc.) are compiled over a period -- usually quarters or years.  Thus longer period data are
the  sums of the  compilation period.  It  follows that  the use of prevailing market  rate
conversion requires the use of averages.
77.  The primary requirement for converting longer period data  is that the conversion
should be made from shorter period data and that longer period data be calculated as the
sums of the converted short period data.  For example, the monthly (quarterly) foreign
trade statistics, if available, in national  currencies should be converted with the respective56
average monthly (quarterly) exchange rates and then summed to obtain the annual data
instead of summing the  monthly (quarterly) data  and then converting with the average
annual  exchange rates.  The  major drawback of the  latter  instance is that  the  annual
average exchange rates may not be in accord or conform with the known contributions of
the annual data within the monthly (quarterly) time periods. Given country X's traditional,
say, fourth  quarter's  trade  or  current  account surplus together  with fluctuating fourth
quarter's exchange rate, any difference in the conversion procedure will result in noticeable
effects on the longer period data expressed in the common numeraire.
78.  The recommendation is obviously clear ... that whenever shorter period data are
available these should be converted at the average of monthly (or even daily) rates and
then summed to  derive longer period data, e.g.,annual data. One should, however, draw
the distinction between what is desirable and what is statistically feasible. Consideration
of statistical feasibility would pre-clude deriving an overall  conversion factor based on
highly disaggregated levels involving  various commodities at respective rates.  More often
than not many macroeconomic data (e.g., GDP, GNP) from developing countries are not
available for the shorter periods but are usually available as annual observations.  In the
extreme circumstance where volatility in the exchange rates is accompanied by fluctuating
volumes of international  transactions, the  adequacy of the  official exchange rate  as a
conversion factor becomes questionable. An alternative conversion factor in such a situation
may  be  in  the  form  of  weighted  exchange  rates  at  a  highly aggregated  level  e.g.,
merchandise trade weighted exchange rate (discussed in Section VIl above) which will
capture traditional cycles not only in the data but also in exchange rates.57
Search for a General Purpose  Conversion  Factor
79.  Much of the Bank's analytical  work on development in member countries and on the
efficacy  of policies require inter-country (region) comparisons which require, at some stage,
the conversion of indicators expressed in national currencies into a common numeraire.
While it is clear that the  preferential  method of conversion is to  use the prevailing or
marke.  valuations, their  determination is not  without ambiguity, even for international
transactions that are relatively free of exchange and trade restrictions. Furthermore, the
national currency value of a country's GNP does not change at the moment its exchange
rate changes; it is the measurement of its value in foreign currency  that changes. Many
value aggregates in GNP  are  not aggregates of international  transactions and  there  is,
therefore, no uniquely "true" conversion factor. They are converted to a common currency
only for the  purpose of  international comparison. Thus  the  search  for an  appropriate
conversion factor should be viewed as a search for a general purpose conversion factor that
applies to major economic aggregates.58
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